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1.
Over the past ten years, Nella Larsens 1929 novel
Passing has become an important reference within
contemporary debates over the status of racial difference, especially those debates carried out by critics
whose work interrogates the thresholds of biology
and culture. For many of these readers, the novel
contains strong suggestions that Larsen herself
viewed "race” as an ontologically bankrupt term.
Samira Kawash, for instance, regards passing narra
tives such as Larsens as part of the project of “dislo
cating the color line,” insofar as the forms of social
encounter these narratives enact — in which geno
typically “black” characters are able to move freely
through otherwise restrictive social spaces by virtue
of their phenotypically “white” characteristics —
“makes impossible and irrelevant appeals to authen
'
ticity as a signal of ethnicity” (149). “Difference,”
Kawash explains, “refers not to some reality... but to
positionality,” a fact that Passing should underscore.
Working along a similar vein of thought, Robyn
Wiegman points out that Passing enacts a “visible
negation of‘blackness’” and thus unsettles the “visible
epistemology of black skin” to which traditional par
adigms of American racism have been anchored.
Larsens literary project, then, takes up an overt polit
ical agenda for such readers, since as Wiegman goes
on to explain, “[t]o interrupt this equation [“between
the idea of ‘race’ and the ‘black’ body”] is crucial to
the political articulation of antiracist cultural cri
tique” (21-2). At the very least, Passing raises persis-
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tent questions concerning the efficacy of racial difference inasmuch as the nar
rative consistently returns to question the premises that ground our knowledge
of such difference. When Larsen’s protagonist, Irene Redfield,
asked to
explain “the trick” of distinguishing an “authentic” Caucasian from an individ
ual who merely passes as one — when, in short, she is asked to locate and give
a name to that thing that makes all the difference between two phenotypically
similar individuals — she can offer little more than the dubious reply: “There
are ways. But they’re not definite or tangible” (Larsen 206). Pushed further,
she adds, “Just — just something. A thing that couldn’t be registered.”
It is, of course, a statement that tends to mystify matters of racial differ
ence, and yet such mystification is what Passing cannot avoid, what Larsen
seems forced to engage in a novel that removes “race” from the level of the phe
notypical, the corporeal, the visible. Irene’s comment might in this sense seem
to offer us a glimpse at Larsen’s true hand in Passing: doesn’t “a thing that
couldn’t be registered,” the ambiguous “something” that purports to substanti
ate racial difference, indicate that
soon as we begin to speak of racial ontol
ogy, we are already knee-deep in pure fantasy, pure projection — that, in short,
the differences between whites and blacks are the differences they themselves
inscribe and maintain? For her part, Kawash follows up on these possibilities
when she suggests that Irene’s remark figures “race” as more “nothing” than
“something,” more a cultural phantasm (like the mysterious “drop of black
blood” that ostensibly condenses the world of difference between blacks and
whites) than a substantive component of biological reality (155).
Such readings of Passing as a narrative project that disturbs essentialist for
mulations of racial difference, and hence challenges the racist economies these
formulations authorize, draw upon a nuanced association between the pleasures
of parody and the political effects of performance. In this sense, Judith Butler’s
reading of Passing deserves special attention, since it was Butler’s earlier Gender
Trouble that first articulated, in ways that resonated widely among Anglophone
cultural critics, the subversive properties of parodic performance. Butler con
tends that parodic performances are inherently disruptive of the norms they
mimic and, more particularly, that the disruptions at issue here disperse them
selves through the vehicle of laughter. “The loss of the sense of ‘the normal,”’
Butler explains, “can be its own occasion for laughter, especially when ‘the nor
mal,’ ‘the original’ is revealed to be a copy, and an inevitably failed one, an ideal
that no one can embody. In this sense, laughter emerges in the realization that
all along the original was derived” (138-9). For Butler, parody and the laugh
ter it incites tend to undermine the matrix of prescribed norms we typically
experience as reality itself, inflicting a form of category crisis that is all the more
powerful because grounded in our sensation of unregulated pleasure.
This model of parodic subversion asserts itself throughout Butler’s later
reading of Passing, especially insofar as this reading finds the tension of Larsen’s
narrative at precisely that point where an understanding of “race” as a biologi
cally sustained and impermeable boundary gives way to the performative
process of passing, the effect of which to submit every absolute racial demar
cation to the prospect of its own contingency and flux. In her reading of
Larsen, Butler explains that “the uncertain border between black and white” —
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the very uncertain, Du Boisian "color line” upon which Irene fails to lay hold as
she gropes for this “thing that couldn’t be registered” — precisely what racist
essentialism must specify in order to maintain its fantasies of racial purity and
hierarchy. For this reason, Butler suggests that passing’s implicit challenge to
naturalistic categories of difference — more specifically, its displacement of
such naturalistic categories with performative simulacra of these categories —
presents a profound threat to racial essentialism and hence racism itself; for the
latter, as Butler explains, it “the spectre of a racial ambiguity that must be
conquered,” that must be refused and effaced in order for the white-suprema
cist mind to retain its own epistemological footing (Bodies 172). Thus, the risky
pleasures to which passing yields access become strictly subordinate to the plea
sures inherent to the form of passing itself, a form in which we witness the col
lapse of “original” into "copy,” of “white” into “black.” In Larsen’s novel, Butler
would suggest, racial ontology itself becomes
kind of joke, since Passing
inspires laughter at the expense of those who cling to such an ontology, dis
crediting those particular criteria of corporeal difference to which larger notions
of racial differentiation are often attached.
To a certain extent, Butler’s premise makes enough sense. When Irene
Redfield, passing into the racially segregated Drayton tearoom, finds herself the
object of an anonymous, apparently Caucasian gaze — when she succumbs to
the fear that a nearby Caucasian onlooker has discerned her legally marginalized
racial status — her growing sense of dread is tempered by her sense of the
ridiculousness of the situation. “Absurd!” she muses. “White people were so
stupid about such things for all that they usually asserted that they were able to
tell; and by the most ridiculous means, finger-nails, palms of hands, shapes of
ears, teeth, and other equally silly rot” (150). The prospect of discovery dead
ly serious for Irene, and yet the whole sequence underlines the “absurd,” laugh
able possibility that, precisely through its myopic fixation upon corporeal
details that actually mean nothing whatsoever, the anonymous Caucasian gaze
has effectively mistaken Irene for what she is. Thus, Larsen tells us, “Irene
laughed softly, but her eyes flashed” (150). That the truth may sometimes arise
from a misrecognition would be funny in itself, if not for Irene’s fear of being
discovered and hence ejected from the Drayton tearoom, but the overriding
joke and its implicit punch line become clear once the anonymous observer
steps forward to introduce herself as Irene’s long-lost childhood friend and fel
low “Negro,” Clare Kendry.
This early moment of revelation typifies Larsen’s narrative technique in
Passing, which often appears at pains to emphasize a dissonance between the
“surface” layer of intersubjective encounter and its underlying substratum of
“authentic” subjective experience. In this first passing encounter of Passing, it
is the passer herself (Irene) who has succumbed to the “absurd” set of racial/corporeal equations that usually lead “white people” to dupe themselves, and that
have now led Irene herself to mistake Clare Kandry for a Caucasian. It also,
however, a critical moment for any approach to Larsen that seeks out Passings
attitude toward racial substance, for after the renewal of acquaintances that
takes place during this sequence, Irene find herself confronted with a vexed
ontological question: in what sense, she now wonders,
Clare actually a
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"Negro,” especially when all of her visible, corporeal qualities — her "ivory” skin
and "golden hair,” for instance — seem to bespeak "whiteness,” so much so that
Irene had never doubted Clare’s Caucasian status even throughout a close visu
al scrutiny of her? Finding herself at a loss to explain precisely how or why the
phenotypically "Caucasian” Clare actually qualifies
"black,” Irene finally
decides that the elusive moment of racial essence resides within the depths of
Clare’s gaze:
Surely! They were Negro eyes! mysterious and concealing,”
Irene concludes, but even here, the eyes of the Negro are not configured with
in the anatomical geometries Irene considers little more than "silly rot” but are
instead mystified, sublimated as that place from which racial difference, Clare’s
secret inheritance from "her grandmother and later her mother and father,” the
"thing that couldn’t be registered” in mere corporeal terms, somehow emanates
(161).
It is also, therefore, a moment that places definite limits upon the subver
sive effects of parodic imitation, since it is the very seamlessness of Clare’s pass
ing performance, the mimetic flawlessness of her simulation of a white woman,
that prompts Irene not to abandon "race”
a legitimate differential term but
rather to re-locate it on a mysterious plane beyond that of the merely corpore
al. Inasmuch as it locates a kernel of raw, unmediated racial alterity within the
sanctum of Clare’s gaze, the sequence in the Drayton anticipates another miseen-scene of performance and misrecognition, one that similarly pokes quiet fun
at what Wiegman calls the "visible epistemology of black skin,” though this
time, the butt of the joke appears in the form of Clare’s husband, the openly
racist John Bellew. Larsen presents Bellew as the dupe, the racist fool who fails
to realize that his own wife among the very "black scrimy devils” he impugns
through his frequent diatribes. When asked to explain his apparently affec
tionate pet name for his wife (usually, we discover, Bellew greets Clare as
"Nig”), he offers Clare and Irene what he clearly considers a clever witticism.
"When we were first married,” he explains, "she was as white as — as — well
white
a lily. But I declare she’s gettin darker and darker. I tell her if she
don’t look out, she’ll wake up one of these days and find she’s turned into a nig
ger” (171). At this, of course, Bellew "roar[s] with laughter,” and his laughter
is reciprocated by the women surrounding him. But though it might appear to
affirm Bellew’s bad joke, the laughter of Clare and Irene actually stems from a
surreptitious comedic source, since both passing women are laughing at Bellew
rather than with him, are laughing at the racist’s ridiculous blindness and truly
laughable assumptions rather than alongside those assumptions. Availing
themselves of that outlet Freud describes in Jokes and Their Relation to the
Unconscious, Clare and Irene laugh as a way of striking a blow at an adversary
they are otherwise powerless to assail; Irene, Larsen tells us, "had a leaping
desire to shout at the man beside her, And you’re sitting here surrounded by
three black devils, drinking tea’” (172), but instead of denouncing Bellew open
ly, Irene savors the hidden comedy through her unconcealed laughter.
So in a definite sense, Irene’s laughter during this sequence also qualifies as
a form of Butlerian, parodic laughter: part of the comedy to which her laugh
ter responds lies in the fact that the ostensibly "Caucasian” women surrounding
Bellew are in fact "copies,” the very "black scrimy devils” from which he imag

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/3

4

Hanlon: The Pleasures of Passing and the Real of Race

Christopher Hanlon

27

ines himself safely distanced. But even if Irenes laughter finds its source in the
very forms of parody and imitation Butler describes in Gender Trouble, this
laughter fails to deliver the liberating, denaturalizing effects Butler forecasts —
quite the opposite, in fact. Larsens description of Irenes laughter draws it out,
stretches it to conspicuous dimensions, so that while the laughter indicates
certain furtive pleasure with Bellew’s catastrophic mistake, the pleasure itself
now appears
if situated along a Mobius strip, now verging upon its reversal
into anguish: “Irene, who had been sitting with lips tightly compressed, cried
out, ‘That’s good!’ and gave way to gales of laughter. She laughed and laughed
and laughed. Tears ran down her cheeks. Her sides ached. Her throat hurt.
She laughed on and on and on, long after the others had subsided” (171). It
while in the midst of this vertigo of laughter, Larsen tells us, that Irene, sud
denly glancing into the eyes of Clare, “encountered her peculiar eyes fixed on
her with an expression so dark and deep and unfathomable that she had for a
short moment the sensation of gazing into the eyes of some creature utterly
strange and apart” (172). Momentarily, Irene sees Clare as a “creature,” a mon
ster of some kind, and in this sense, Irene sees Clare as Bellew sees all African
Americans: even if not precisely as “black scrimy devils,” certainly as “unfath
omable” and “utterly strange and apart.” As in the earlier sequence in the Dray
ton, the gaze of Clare contains something “dark and deep,” something as
“unfathomable” as race itself, the “thing that couldn’t be registered” otherwise.
So even if readers such as Kawash, Wiegman, and Butler are fundamental
ly correct when they suggest that Passing turns suspicious eye toward tradi
tional notions of racial difference, and even if they are correct when they insist
that the novel works to undermine those connections between corporeality and
“race” that have most usually been taken for granted in American culture, why
then do such moments from Passing seem to invest racial difference with a
phantasmic power that perseveres despite the ontological deficiencies of “race ?
The first contention I want to make here is that Passings paradoxical fixation
with racial difference (ontologically bankrupt on the one hand yet irreducibly
charged on the other) should remind us of what Jaques Lacan aims at in his
deliberations over another category of difference — sexual difference — and
especially in his insistence that sexual difference real. By referring to sexual
difference
real, Lacan does not mean that sexual difference pertains to some
level of immutable, biologically fixed “reality” that stands apart from our dis
cursive or epistemological renditions of sex but rather that sexual difference
belongs to what he terms the order of the real, precisely as that which cannot be
enclosed in either the symbolic register (which to say, in language itself) or
what Lacan refers to as the imaginary (the visual world of corporeal images by
means of which the subject may liken or differentiate herself from others).
“Real,” for Lacan, what perturbs both the imaginary and the symbolic, what
exceeds the conceptual limits of either domain, and in Passing, racial difference
— like sexual difference as described by Lacan — appears as “the essential
object which isn’t an object any longer, but this something faced with which all
words cease and all categories fail, the object of anxiety par excellence” (Semi
nar II 164). Passing, in other words, denies racial difference both its symbolic
and its imaginary support: in this novel, there is no phrase that can answer the
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question, "What is racial difference?” (we have seen, for instance, how a version
of this question leaves Irene Redfield with nothing meaningful to say), and nei
ther does there seem to be any corporeal quality or set of qualities that can reli
ably distinguish members of putatively distinct racial groups (all such efforts at
the corporeal specification of race,
Irene rightly muses, are little more than
"silly rot”). But the symbolic and imaginary bankruptcy of "race” as the term
functions or dysfunctions in Passing should not lead us to conclude that Larsen
dismisses the term
a mere social illusion — a mere "nothing” that twentieth
century subjects continue wrongly to invest
"something.” Instead, Larsens
treatments of racial difference aim at its impossibly charged status, the sense in
which racial difference, beyond the fact of its imaginary or symbolic deficien
cies, replete with its own real symptomatology. Another way to put this to
say that regardless of Larsens purpose the effect of her narrative is to reverse
the sort of historicist premise that informs so many approaches to her novel
today: the point about Passing is not simply that racial difference is an histor
ically contingent notion, that certain twentieth-century American subjects cre
ated or inscribed racial difference for the purposes of post-reconstruction
racism. The point, rather, is something like the opposite, that racial difference
is in a way what created or inscribed the twentieth-century American subject.

2.
This to suggest that the sort of antiracist cultural critique for which Wiegman calls (and which she also enacts in sophisticated and illuminating ways),
the fundamental aim of which is to interrupt the axis "between the idea of‘race’
and the ‘black’ body,” falls somewhat short of the challenge Larsen poses in
Passing. For if the racist economies Larsen unveils persist even in the apparent
absence of such a connection, this would imply that the cultural force of "race”
is conceptually resistant to any critical tactic that focuses strictly upon the dubi
ousness of its corporeal transfigurations.
What exactly meant by "race”
the word is used and contested in Pass
ing? Responding to his wife’s self-assured remark ("What would it matter if
... I were one or two percent coloured?”), Bellew exclaims, "Oh, no, Nig. [. ..]
Nothing like that with me. I know you’re no nigger, so it’s all right. You can
get as black as you please as far as I’m concerned, since I know you’re no nig
ger” (171). It is an intriguing formulation. Bellew’s statement would imply
that "nigger” is something that is irreducible to a set of positive physical char
acteristics, though these very characteristics are at the same time what demar
cate whites from blacks. (Again: "I declare she’s gettin’ darker and darker. I
tell her if she don’t look out, she’ll wake up one of these days and find she’s
turned into a nigger.”) That is, one "can get as black as [one] please[s],” as far
as Bellew is concerned, without actually qualifying as "black”; blackness thus
designates a kind of uncanny surplus, what is "in the subject more than the sub
ject itself,” to borrow the Lacanian phrase; and in Passing, racial substance most
often resides here, a kernel of alterity that exceeds the literal characteristics that
designate alterity itself. If one may embody all of the physical qualities associ-
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ated with blackness without actually being black, this means that “black” is that
which bypasses the level of imaginary identification (the level of specularizable
difference by means of which one may liken or differentiate oneself), penetrat
ing to the level of the real, the supposed inner stratum of the subject in his or
her raw authenticity. So when Bellew explains that Clare may become as dark
ly colored
she pleases without actually becoming “coloured,” the corollary of
this logic is that one may appear as “Bly” white as whites themselves without
actually being white. The matrix of corporeal qualities (skin, nose, hair, and so
on) that ostensibly separates whites from blacks functions strictly as pretext
here: what matters for the white-supremacist mentality that Bellew incarnates
and Passing exposes is the phantasmic moment of difference that, since it can
never be confined to a finite set of terms, can never be dispelled.
Such a prospect of an immaterial and yet substantial kernel of racial alteri
ty allows us to see how passing, far from undermining the apparently rigid sys
tem of partitions that appears on the surface level of racist fantasy (in which the
divisions that separate whites from blacks are presented as absolute and imper
meable), actually provides the necessary exception that grounds the white
supremacist logic. If, as Bellew believes, African Americans are not only the
bearers of a particular class of physical characteristics but also the embodiment
and source of a deep social malignancy (as he informs the passing women in his
home, “I read in the papers about them. Always robbing and killing people”
[172]), what, may we imagine, would be Bellew’s response to an African Amer
ican who did not rob and kill? To Bellew’s paranoiac vision of “all blacks” as
those who rob and kill, we may of course add a list of traditional stereotypes:
all blacks are lazy, all blacks are unintelligent, all blacks are possessed of an
excessive sexual drive for which their unhappy social predicament may be
blamed, and so on. The point here is that such lists are, like the physical char
acteristics Clare may display without “really” being black, pure pretext; the log
ical formulae, “Because they steal,” “Because they are lazy,” and “Because they
cannot control their urges” all serve to obscure the fundamental logic: “Because
they are black — because there is a universal something in them that overrides
its own particular expression in theft, violence, or indigence.” If we are to
imagine Bellew — or someone like Bellew — faced with a black subject who
does not exhibit any of these supposedly constant, particular qualities, we can
also easily imagine how he would explain such a phenomenon without relin
quishing his understanding of what blackness entails. His refrain would go
something like this: “Do you see how clever they are? Here we have one who
carefully refrains from criminal activity, who manages to keep his sexual urges
in check, who has learned to sound intelligent. ... In short, here we have a
black who has learned to pass
white!”
It is this paradox of an exception to the universal law, the exception that
rather than undermining actually grounds the law as universally effective, that
Lacan articulated in his mathemes of sexual difference contained in the twen
tieth seminar, Encore. If, as Lacan suggests, all subjects are subject to the uni
versal condition of castration, this maxim nevertheless provides space for “at
least one” subject that is not castrated (what Lacan calls the Name-of-theFather, the master signifier against which all other signifiers appear as lacking
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or "castrated”), so that the universal rule requires some particular instance that
escapes its function.1 Intrinsic to the white-supremacist logic according to
which "all blacks” are x, according to which all black subjects fall under the
dominion of some universal rule or set of rules, is the proviso that "some blacks”
may not exhibit x traits; in order to maintain its epistemological footing in the
face of clear evidence that many blacks are not the embodiment of x, the white
supremacist mindset we are describing must have recourse to a conceptual
frame within which "some blacks” may appear to escape the universal rule con
cerning "all blacks” that defines white supremacy itself. The key point here is
that passing in no way constitutes a threat to racist-essentialist thinking, not
even insofar as it allegedly "deconstructs” the rigidly binarist logic of
white/black; on the contrary, it is only through reference to the possibility of
passing itself that racists can maintain their essentialist convictions in the face
of black subjects who do not fit their paradigm of what "all blacks” must be.
Of definite interest here, moreover, is the way in which this sleight of hand
by means of which the prospect of racial essence is preserved, even once bereft
of its imaginary or symbolic support, is played out within much of the criticism
Larsen’s novel has generated over the past few decades. According to readers
such as Cheryl Wall and Mary Mabel Youman, Passing presents a pair of
women, Irene and Clare, who have paid for their upper-middle class existence
by severing what Irene at one point refers to as "the bonds of race.” 1920s
upper-middle-class affluence is thus diametrically opposed not only to solidar
ity with other African Americans (Irene’s orchestration of tea parties for vari
ous racial uplift organizations does in fact seem hypocritically distanced from
actual political involvement) but also more troublingly to the self-acceptance of
"blackness” itself. Even Deborah McDowell, whose pathbreaking work with
the queer dimensions of Larsen’s narrative distinguishes itself from the more
racially focused readings of other scholars, argues that Larsen "parodies the
manners and morals of the black middle class” with her "descriptions of the
endless tea and cocktail parties, and charity balls [that] capture the sterility and
banality of the bourgeoisie” (xxv). The manners and morals at issue here are
codified as "white” manners and morals, so that Irene’s comfortable lifestyle
may be treated the index of her alienation — or, as McDowell puts it, of the
problem of "racial identity and loyalty” raised by Irene’s genteel existence
(xxvii).2 A sequence from Larsen’s 1928 novel Quicksand provides another case
study for this tendency in Larsen scholarship. When the (also) mulatta, (also)
bourgeois Helga Crane attends a Harlem cabaret in which, Larsen tells us, "the
essence of life seemed bodily motion” (59), her involvement and fascination
with the scene is somehow tinged with a sense of displacement, so that "when
suddenly the music died, [Helga] dragged herself back to the present with
conscious effort; and a shameful certainty that not only had she been in the jun
gle, but that she had enjoyed it, began to taunt her.” For Cheryl Wall, the
severe sense of disjointedness to which Helga succumbs during this sequence
comes about a result of her close encounter with the ethnic Thing she strives
to repress throughout the rest of the novel. For such readers, the repression of
one’s own racial identity becomes the dominant leitmotif of Larsen’s work, as in
Youmans explanation that “Passing, in my opinion, is a novel which shows that
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Blacks can and do lose the spiritual values of Blackness though they remain in
the Black world” (235)
What deserves attention in such readings of Larsen, which formulate sort
of repressive hypothesis concerning upper-middle-class, African-American
subjects who appear detached from the set of desires that are even today often
taken as somehow fundamental to the "authentic” African-American subjective
experience, is the supposition these readings necessarily entail: strictly by virtue
of their racial status — albeit a racial status that is comprised neither by "black”
physical characteristics (since these are a priori ""invisible” in passing novels) nor
allegedly ""black” proclivities (since it is the absence of such proclivities that
itself remarked upon as conspicuous) — African-American subjects are by def
inition "out of joint” within the staid milieu of the bourgeoisie. This supposi
tion carries with it an implicit injunction: in order to ""be black” (that is, in
order to show solidarity with other African Americans, in order to attain the
ideal of self-realization, in order to be ""comfortable with who I am,” and so on),
African-American subjects must not only make certain choices (for instance,
they must choose the cabaret over the tea-party), they must also go the further
step of actually enjoying the "correct” choice. It is not enough simply to go
through ones social ritual in a mechanical, dutiful fashion, since one may
attend the cabaret without really embracing it; rather, one must take the addi
tional step of actually, "really” preferring this cultural ritual over that one. If one
cannot make this psychic turn — if, in spite of going through all of the outward
motions that should signal one’s willingness to embrace some sense of ethnic
belonging, one
nevertheless unable to close one’s sense of distance — this
failure points to the fact that one "still passing”; the inability to enjoy the rit
ual wholeheartedly is indicative of a fundamental betrayal.3
It should come as no surprise that this formula for racial essentialism, one
that draws explicitly upon wider suppositions about the modes of pleasure and
preference proper to racially distinct individuals, extends beyond Larsen’s work
to infiltrate many levels of contemporary culture. Perhaps the most striking
recent instance of the demand that African Americans organize their desires in
particular ways appears as the central trope of George Tillman’s 1997 film Soul
Food, where ethnic cuisine used as the fundamental test of the subject’s self
acceptance. The particular pairing of words that makes up this film’s title is of
course related to the Lacanian motif of sublimation, whereby a random, arbi
trary object ("food”) is elevated to the status of the formless, ineffable Thing
that is the subject as such ("soul”). That is, the degree to which one loves one
self and one’s family
African American is precisely commensurate, in Till
man’s film, with one’s desire for "soul food”; only by renouncing other culinary
styles, or at least subordinating one’s taste for these styles, can the subject prove
his or her solidarity and self-acceptance. Another version of this problematic
is well-known to African-American literary scholars who choose to specialize
in, for example, Victorian or Chaucerian Studies
opposed to (again for
instance) the nineteenth-century slave narrative or postcolonial theory. Often
such scholars may be regarded as unusual exceptions to the universal rule that
all black scholars are postcolonial theorists of the slave narrative, so that the
very existence of such individuals seems to betray a form of deep "identity
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struggle” on their behalf: does not the very fact that here is an African-Amer
ican intellectual who does not show any interest in such areas of inquiry point
to the fact that this individual has already been interpellated into the white
supremacist mindset that privileges George Eliot over Harriet Jacobs? Does
not the fact that this individual has failed not only to choose Jacobs over Eliot
but to do so freely, to prefer wholeheartedly Jacobs to Eliot, indicate the sad
truth that this individual is really ‘passing” — not only to other academics but,
more tragically, to him- or herself?

3.

So — to return to our earlier concern — while Butler’s tendency is to invest
pleasure, and especially the sort of spontaneous pleasure she associates with par
odic laughter,
a form of unregulated affect that provides our surest resistance
against the normative prescriptions of race, gender, and so on, I would point out
that in many cases, the very “authentic” pleasure of the subject who would resist
his or her normative, paradigmatic role is already the projection par excellence
of this role, already well within the horizon of the normative paradigm to which
this subject is already submitted. On the view I offer, we cannot extract the
subject in his or her authenticity through reference to this subject’s apparently
genuine experience of pleasure because even at this innermost level of the sub
ject’s self-experience, the subject’s psychic interiority is already co-opted and
reduced by external socio-symbolic forces. This, moreover, is what Lacan aims
at with his insistence that “Desire is desire of the Other” (Seminar XI235): the
same internal, private desire to which we might appeal in order to extract the
subject from his or her suffocating, publicly induced, socio-symbolic role in
fact already the extenuation of this role, such that the opposition of surface and
depth that seems to inform so much of the criticism Passing generates finally
becomes impossible to maintain.
This is to say that the public level of socio-symbolic exchange and
encounter intrudes upon the psychic interiority of the subject of Passing, and to
such an extent that this intrusion provides the fundamental scheme for the
novel’s narrative process. Toward the end of Passing, the collapse of boundaries
between private desire and public happenstance follows a pattern of wish-ful
fillment, wherein Irene’s internal drives are realized through the activities of
others, actuated in the public space — but apparently without her explicit con
sent. After arriving at the conclusion that Clare has been carrying on an affair
with Irene’s husband, Brian, Irene suddenly realizes “how easily she could put
Clare out of her fife! She had only to tell John Bellew — No. Not that!” If
Bellew were to stumble upon the fact that Clare is in fact a passing “Negro,”
Irene concludes, “[i]t would be enough to rid her forever of Clare Kendry”
(225). Irene, however, immediately abandons this plan, unable to muster the
resolve necessary to inform Bellew of Clare’s secret identity — but sure enough,
“[a]s if in answer to her wish,” Larsen tells us, the very next scene of Passing
brings Irene face to face with John Bellew, whom she meets in a chance
encounter on the streets of downtown Manhattan. During this second meet
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ing with Bellew, Irene is literally “linked,” arm in arm, with her friend Felise
Freeland, an African American whose skin too dark to allow her to pass, and
so Irene does not have to say a word in order for Bellew to conclude that his
wife, as well as Irene Redfield, consorts with “Negroes” and hence (according to
the string of associations that apparently structures Bellew’s logic) may well be
black herself.
Since her earlier hopes are now reached through an unplanned encounter,
and further, since they are realized not by Irene herself but chiefly by virtue of
the paranoid associations of Bellew (who apparently believes that mere contact
with African Americans indicates one’s identification with African Americans),
Irene is spared having to confront the fact that she herself has been psychically
complicit in this disclosure of Clare’s secret; she able, in other words, to dis
avow her own previous desire for such a meeting with Bellew, since she herself
did nothing to orchestrate this meeting. The denouement of Passing, moreover,
follows a similar trajectory of disavowal and wish-fulfillment. After realizing
that Bellew’s discovery of Clare’s identity will probably cause him simply to
divorce his wife (as in the contemporaneous case of “Kip” Rhinelander, who was
granted a divorce in New York State after the revelation of his wife’s AfricanAmerican status) and hence free the latter to pursue a relationship with Brian,
Irene now concludes she would be happiest if Clare would simply die. Once
again, Irene immediately represses this traumatic wish (“Oh, it was vile!” she
thinks, “To think, yes, to wish that!” [228]), and once again, the disavowal of
the wish immediately precedes the wish’s chance realization; in the closing
pages of the novel, Clare falls from a sixth-story window, apparently in response
to her husband’s denunciation of her as “a nigger, a damned dirty nigger!”
(238).4
All of this is not simply intended as an digression into the question of
Irene’s level of responsibility for Clare’s social and literal downfall, for the ques
tions of accountability at play in both of these mysterious sequences finally
intersect with the problems of identity and agency intrinsic to passing itself.
Who, after all, passes in Passing? When Clare or Irene passes, she never does
so by means of a direct proclamation of whiteness; rather, it is the network of
communally held, socially circulated assumptions, assumptions grounded in a
model of Caucasian normativity, that does the passing for both women, that
generates the fiction that each woman then only inhabits — into which she
simply passes. Is passing equivalent to lying? If so, it is the sort of lie from
which the subject retains a definite distance, a “lie” that initiates and sustains
itself quite apart from the passing subject’s overt efforts at deception. In this
sense, passing of a piece with the sort of lie at issue in Freud’s famous joke
concerning the two Jews — First Jew: “I’m going to Cracow.” Second Jew:
“Liar! Why do you tell me you’re going to Cracow so that I’ll think you’re
going to Lvov? You, in fact, are going to Cracow!” (Jokes 115; see also Lacan,
Écrits 173).
The lesson Lacan extrapolates from Freud’s joke that while many animals
can deceive, human beings are the animals that can lie by telling the truth, who
can formulate “lies” strictly in light of the Other’s unwillingness to see the truth
even and perhaps especially when it
hidden in plain sight. Larsen’s acute
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understanding of the logic behind Freud’s joke imbues every page of Passing,
where passing mainly occurs at the level of the Other’s myopic failure to see
blackness except as an aberration of norms. It is in the spirit of this joke, more
over, that Larsen invites us to laugh alongside Irene and Clare as the latter asks
her husband, “My goodness, Jack! What difference would it make if, after all
these years, you were to find out that I was one or two percent coloured?”
To speak of this dynamic
a form of subversive performance obscures the
sense in which passing only acquires its performative status against the backdrop of primarily repressive presuppositions and prerogatives; the day-to-day
activities of a subject only become a form of passing once enclosed within a
conceptual space that overdetermines these activities as inherently transgres
sive. This why Irene, who later admits to occasional passing “for the sake of
convenience” (227) and whom we witness in the act of passing on at least two
occasions, nevertheless distances herself from the act itself. “Tell me, honest
ly,” Clare asks, “haven’t you ever thought of passing’?” Irene responds, “No.
Why should I?” (160). Irene’s response does not, as we might initially think,
twist the truth so very far indeed, since one need not premeditate or even think
of one’s own passing in order actually to pass; passing, rather, occurs by its own
volition, is already underway prior to the passing subject’s apprehension. “It’s
funny about passing,”’ Irene later comments. “We disapprove of it and at the
same time condone it. It excites our contempt and yet we rather admire it. We
shy away from it with an odd kind of revulsion, but we protect it” (186). Like
racial difference itself, passing extends from a point beyond the words the sub
ject speaks, prior to the images he or she embodies, emerges from a place past
the reaches of these considerations, where contempt, revulsion, and fascination
merge into one another. “A thing that couldn’t be registered,” indeed.

Notes
1. See Lacan, Seminar XX 78-80: “through the phallic function . . . man
as a whole acquires his inscription, with the proviso that this function is limit
ed due to the existence of an x by means of which the function Φx [Lacan’s
matheme for castration] is negated” (79).
2. Other readers who follow the trajectory I describe here, by means of
which Irene and/or Clare are viewed subjects who actively efface some extant
dimension of racial/ethnic “identity” through the cultural alignments they
assume, include Davis, whose critical biography of Larsen explains that Irene’s
attraction for Clare should be read
an “aesthetic attraction to whiteness” that
we should understand as a “logical extension of her bourgeoisie lifestyle and
ideology” (306), and Sullivan, who contends that “Irene passes’ not by adopt
ing a white identity
Clare does, but by adopting white values, including
white standards of beauty” (374). Last, I might mention that by interrogating
the formal logic these readings seem to embrace, I do not mean to deny the
possibility that Irene is indeed invested in some form of racial distancing
throughout Passing. Rather, what I am trying to underline here is simply that
signifiers of affluence and blackness need not exist in an antithetical relation
ship.
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3. The implicit injunction at issue here is thus a version of what Lacan
refers to as the superegoic demand. As Lacan stressed over and over again,
superego and law are not equivalent, since while the law insists that the subject
must curtail his or her enjoyment (and thus tacitly incites transgression), the
superego issues the very opposite commandment: “Enjoy!” Superego, Lacan
explains, emerges out of the blind spots of the law, the places at which “the law
is entirely reduced to something, which cannot even be expressed, like the You
must, which is speech deprived of all its meaning” (Seminar I 102). In the con
ceptual framework of Larsens novels, we can see how the superegotistical
injunction to enjoy can be infinitely more oppressive than mere prohibition.
How, after all, can the subject obey such a demand? Often, he or she simply
cannot; for Helga Crane, who cannot unproblematically enjoy herself at the
cabaret, the failure to respond correctly to stimuli that “should” (according to
readers such as Wall and Youman) provide pleasure and satisfaction produces a
very particular, poisonous form of guilt, the guilt of a subject whose very failure
to enjoy must indicate a deeper loathing of the values that supposedly comprise
his or her core being as subject. On the superegotistical injunction to enjoy, see
Lacan, Ecrits 256. For more detailed analyses of the split between law and
superego, see Žižek, Metastases 54-85 and Plague 113-7.
4. Almost all Larsen scholars have focused upon this final sequence in an
attempt to solve the plot-level mystery it seems to present. Irene herself, after
all, standing closest to Clare when the latter falls, and so the narrative raises
the possibility that Irene, and not Bellew or Clare herself, is the actual agent
behind this catastrophe. Indeed, Irene herself appears on the verge of such a
conclusion in the novel’s final moments; apparently suffering from a form of
amnesia as she tries to sort through the events immediately prior to Clare’s
death, Irene nevertheless recalls “the image of her hand on Irene’s arm” (239),
a memory that costs her the realization that she herself may have pushed Clare
from the open window. But since the novel simply does not supply its reader
with the factual information required to reach this conclusion, it is helpful here
to refer, once again, to Lacan’s distinction between reality and the real. Accord
ing to Lacan, even when a husband who suffers from the delusion that his wife
unfaithful discovers that his wife has indeed been carrying on a series of
affairs, the reality of his wife’s indiscretions in no way changes the fact that the
husband is a paranoid delusional. In such an instance, Lacan tells us, “reality”
renders itself as projection or symptom of the real, the real as condensed in
the husband’s paranoid delusions of his cheating wife (which, we can well
imagine, would persist even if his wife were utterly faithful). For this reason,
Lacan stipulates in his eleventh seminar that “the unconscious is outside”; the
unconscious, in other words, does not end at the periphery of internal, purely
psychic associations and fixations. Rather, it is bound up with the material real
ity of the world that surrounds us, infiltrating the sphere of social relations
itself. Mutatis mutandis, our final assessments of Irene’s role during this scene
should not depend upon whether or not she herself actually pushes Clare from
the sixth-story window, for the fact is that, whoever initiated Clare’s fall, Irene
herself is responsible for having desired this fall; the entire sequence, like the
earlier sequence during which Bellew accidentally discovers his wife’s African-
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American status, should be read as the public rendition of Irene’s private
desires, and hence as an illustration of reality’s symptomatic relation to the real.
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